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Consumer Perception of Deposit 
Insurance: Little Awareness, Limited 
Effectiveness?1 
 






This paper provides unique survey evidence on consumer awareness about deposit insurance. We find 
that knowledge on the eligibility for deposit insurance is limited, in particular when it concerns small 
banks. In addition, consumers generally expect an associated payback time that well exceeds the time 
it has taken to pay back depositors in the past. Moreover, they believe repayment is more likely and 
faster for large, systemic banks. This confirms that households’ awareness of the coverage and 
operations of deposit insurance are suboptimal. We also find that knowledge about the scheme is 
correlated with the probability to stay under the maximum guaranteed amount. Trust in the deposit 
insurance system however has only a marginal effect on the observed deposit behavior in “normal” 
and “crisis” times. Moreover, respondents have a strong preference for a deposit insurance scheme 
with a high coverage rate and are willing to accept a long payback time in return. All in all, limited 
knowledge about deposit insurance might partly explain why its effectiveness in reality is at odds with 
the effectiveness that theory predicts. 
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In 1960 the US was the only developed country with deposit insurance. Since then almost 100 
countries have introduced deposit insurance and the cov rage of these schemes has risen steadily 
during the last decades (Alessandri and Haldane, 2009). Deposit insurance aims to improve financial 
stability by preventing bank runs (Hoelscher et al., 2006). In particular, deposit insurance is meant to 
influence depositor behavior by insuring them against the risk of bankruptcy. Consumers will not run 
on a bank that faces bankruptcy if they are convinced they will get their deposits back quickly.4 
 
Theoretically, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue in their seminal paper that bank runs can be 
prevented when deposits are fully and credibly insured. This finding is replicated in laboratory 
experiments (Madies, 2006; and Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009), although these experimental papers 
disagree on the extent of coverage that is necessary to fully prevent bank runs. However, the existing 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of deposit in urance shows that in practice deposit insurance 
schemes might not be as effective as theory and laboratory settings predict.  
 
Several empirical macro-studies have tried to identify the effect of the existence of a deposit insurance 
scheme on between country differences in the occurrence of banking crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) argue that banking crises have taken place 
more often in countries with explicit insurance of deposits. Studies examining micro-evidence 
concerning bank runs are scarce. A notable exception is a paper by Iyer and Puri (2010) who use a 
unique minute-by-minute depositor withdrawal dataset from an Indian bank that faced a run following 
the bankruptcy of another bank. They show that clients with deposits below the deposit insurance 
limit are less likely to run than those with deposits above this limit. However, their data also suggests 
that the effect of deposit insurance on withdrawals is small. Almost 90% of the clients who run are 
actually fully insured, while even for fully insured customers a higher account balance increases the 
probability of running. Anecdotal evidence on several bank runs in developed countries such as the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium during the recent financial crisis also suggests that 
high deposit insurance coverage does not prevent bank runs from occurring. 
 
Also, theory suggests that deposit insurance may undermine market discipline by depositors. Fully 
insured deposit holders choose those banks that provide the highest interest rates and do not take the 
trade-off between risk and returns into account. As a consequence, if banks are not charged 
appropriate risk-dependent insurance premia they will increase the riskiness of their portfolio in orde  
to attract deposits. See Freixas and Rochet (2008) for an overview of the theoretical literature on the
effects of incorrectly priced deposit insurance. In co trast to this prediction, Peria and Schmukler 
(2001) show - using bank data from Argentina, Chile and Mexico - that deposit insurance does not 
seem to undermine market discipline. In fact, they find that even insured depositors discipline banks 
by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. 
 
The empirical findings on bank runs and market discipline, at least in emerging markets, are thus at 
odds with the theoretical predictions from the litera ure. In this paper we explore one possible 
explanation for these puzzling facts: perhaps depositholders are either not fully aware of or do not 
fully trust deposit insurance schemes. Indeed, if consumers think the insurance fund will be slow to 
pay out insured deposits or if they suspect their insured deposits may not be fully repaid, they will st
be inclined to switch to a safer bank in case of financial turmoil. Hence, deposit insurance might not 
prevent a run on the bank, and banks remain subject to market discipline even in the presence of 
deposit insurance. As far as we know consumer percetion of bank risk and deposit insurance has not 
yet received any attention in the literature. A recent working paper by Cruijsen et al (2011) is 
 
4 A second goal is to protect the wealth of small deposit holders in case of a bank failure. For example, in the Netherlands ‘The DGS 
aims to protect small deposit holders, and to secure trust in the financial system, such that a bank run can be prevented’ (Ministry 





somewhat related as it investigates what the general public knows about banking supervision. They 
conclude that a large share of the Dutch public is only poorly aware of the tasks and responsibilities of 
bank supervisors.  
 
To investigate these issues, we have conducted a questionnaire in February 2011 on knowledge of the 
 Dutch deposit insurance scheme, perception of payback time and coverage, perception of bank risk, 
and consumer preferences on deposit insurance coverage versus payback time. The questionnaire also 
included questions on the economic behavior of respondents such as the allocation of deposits over 
different banks, the amount of deposits held with these banks, and behavior in the wake of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. The appendix contains a detailed description of the questionnaire. 
 
First,  
we find that a considerable fraction of consumers think the DI-scheme will not fully reimburse an 
accountholder with 50.000 euro, while the official coverage rate in The Netherlands is currently 
100.000 euro. Moreover, almost half of respondents think it will take half a year or longer before they 
have access to their savings again. In contrast, when two banks went bankrupt recently, it took only 
three months to repay depositors. We conclude that a large group of consumers are pessimistic about 
what fraction of deposits they will actually get refunded and how long this will take. Thus, our paper 
provides important evidence that knowledge and trust in deposit insurance is limited even in more 
advanced economies. 
 
Second, our results suggest that trust in the deposit insurance scheme is not highly correlated with 
behavior. Knowledge on the eligibility of certain banks for deposit insurance however seems to be 
correlated with a stronger tendency to spread savings over banks and with the probability to not 
exceed the maximum guaranteed amount at a particula bank. In addition, individuals´ subjective risk 
assessment of banks partly determines the number of banks wealth is spread over. We show 
furthermore that this risk assessment is associated with the ´flight to safety´ during the past financial 
crisis and ´transactions´ after the specific recent ba kruptcies in The Netherlands. This suggests tha 
differences in perceived banking risks may enhance the tendency to run on the bank. 
 
Finally, depositors seem to prefer a deposit insurance scheme with a higher coverage rate over a 
scheme that has a shorter payback time. This preferenc  is stronger for those with high levels of bank 
deposits, while trust in and knowledge of the deposit in urance scheme are also correlated with a 
preference for a high coverage level. Apparently, if people are convinced that the DI-scheme will 
operate as planned, they are willing to wait longer for their lost deposits.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the Dutch banking sector and the DI-scheme in 
some detail. Our dataset is the subject of Section 3. Section 4 deals with knowledge of and trust in the 
Dutch deposit insurance scheme. Section 5 focuses on depositors´ behavior, respectively on the 
allocation of deposits over multiple banks and on withdrawals in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. In Section 6, we discuss the preferences of consumers over two important characteristics of the 







2 The Dutch deposit insurance scheme 
The Dutch deposit insurance scheme was set-up after the failure of a small bank called Teixeira de 
Mattos in 1966. Initially, the scheme consisted of a system of collective guarantees, which evolved 
into law in 1978. The system of collective guarantees was first tested in the early 1980’s, when two 
small banks went bankrupt, the Amsterdam American Bank in 1981 and the Tilburgse Hypotheekbank 
in 1982. After that, the Dutch deposit insurance scheme was more or less a dormant institution that 
fell under the responsibility of a single employee at the Dutch Central Bank (DNB).5 
 
This changed when in 2005 a small bank based in Amsterdam, Van der Hoop bankiers, went bankrupt 
due to mismanagement.6 The 1400 account holders lost their deposits and their losses were initially 
repaid, 20 million euro in total, under the DI-scheme.7 In the aftermath of this bankruptcy, the DI-
scheme was incorporated in a comprehensive overhaul of Dutch financial regulation. In the process, 
the level of insured deposits was raised from 20.000 to 40.000 euro, with the amount of savings over 
20.000 euro being insured for 90 percent only.8 This co-payment aimed to incentivize consumers to 
take into account banking risks when allocating their savings. 
 
During the height of the financial crisis, in October 2008, the DI-scheme again became the focus of 
attention. Right after the Lehman bankruptcy, the Dutch government temporarily increased the 
maximum insured amount from 40.000 to 100.000 euro, hoping that this would reduce volatility in the 
Dutch savings market. Coinciding with this increase in coverage, the Icelandic bank Landsbanki, that 
was active in The Netherlands under the brand name IceSave, became insolvent and was unable to 
pay out depositors. The bank officially fell under the Icelandic deposit insurance scheme for the first 
20.887 euro per deposit holder, and under the Dutch deposit scheme up to 100.000 euro.9 DNB took 
care of initially paying back all deposits up to 100.000 euro. Within three months of Landsbanki’s 
bankruptcy, 100.000 Dutch account holders owning 1.6 billion euro in total could access their 
deposits again.  
 
One year later, in October 2009, another bank run occurred at the Dirk Scheringa Bank (DSB), after 
an activist had summoned accountholders to withdraw their money in a popular morning television 
show. Within 11 days deposit holders withdrew 622 million euro. DSB did not survive the bank run, 
and the DI-scheme was activated on the 19th of October 2009. In total, 3.5 billion euro was paid out 
to depositors. This time, the bank fully fell under the Dutch DI. This implied that the DNB repaid 
depositors their insured savings and that other Dutch banks were liable for the amount paid out under 
the DI. DNB managed to repay 93% of the 225.000 depositors that filed a claim within three months, 
while 85% received their money back within several days.10 
 
These changes, together with the increase in the amount of savings from 160 billion in 1998 to almost 
340 billion in 2010, have substantially raised the aggregate amount of deposits that fall under the 
scheme substantially. Figure 1 below  shows how the total savings covered by the DI- scheme has 
 
5 De Nederlandsche Bank acts both as the Dutch central bank and as the prudential regulator of the Dutch financial sector. 
6 The direct cause was a claim of the Dutch tax authority on the bank. 
7 Eventually, all deposit holders were repaid. 
8 In case the DI-scheme was called upon, the Dutch Central Bank would initially take up the bill, which would result in a claim of the 
central bank on the remaining banks in the scheme. 
9 The Dutch deposit insurance scheme is only applicable to deposits at those banks that DNB has the supervision over. The deposits 
at non-EU banks are not guaranteed, while those at EU-banks fall under the local agreement in the home country. However, 
whenever the national scheme in EU-countries (plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) is less generous than the Dutch scheme, 
the Dutch DI-system will guarantee the remaining difference. 





increased from 50 billion euro in 1998 to more than 400 billion euro in 2011.11 Note that a large 
fraction of the guarantee benefits either consumers from other countries or firms. In addition, also the 
probability of the DI-scheme being called upon has increased. Indicative of this higher probability is 
the huge increase in CDS spreads for large Dutch banks since the beginning of the crisis in 2007. 
Another indicator is the monthly amount of deposits being shifted between banks. Figure 2 below 
shows the aggregate of monthly witdrawals by Dutch households at Dutch banks. It went up rapidly in 
2007, with a peak in October 2008, and has come down since then, although the level of volatility of 
private deposits is still higher than it used to be before the financial crisis. 
Figure 1  Domestic deposits and total deposits (mln euro) 
 
 




11 In 2008 the Ministry of Finance estimated this to be approximately 365 billion euros znc in 2010 at 390 billion euro’s. These are 
shown as dots in the figure and are quite close to our estimates, which combines the distribution of savings over banks in our 
survey, as well as data on savings by Dutch households (Tabel 11.1 Vermogenscomponenten van Nederlandse huishoudens, totaal 
deposito’s)  and total savings held by banks (Tabel 5.6 Balansen van geregistreerde kredietinstellingen (bedrijfseconomische 
opstelling), spaargelden) from DNB. The dotted line is a rough estimate asDNB has no data for recent years. We impute it as a 


























































































































































































All this has restored the deposit insurance scheme back to the center of the policy arena and 
policymakers on the national as well as the European l vel are rethinking the design of deposit 
insurance. In June 2009 a joint report of DNB, the Dutch Association of Banks and the Ministry of 
Finance was published about the future of the DI-scheme. Other Dutch official bodies, such as the 
committee Maas and committee De Wit, have also recently suggested alterations, particularly to the 
financing structure of the Dutch scheme. The EU has issued a Directive on the 12th of July 2010 to 
harmonize the existing schemes within its member state .  While the official maximum pay-back time 
used to be three months, EU guidelines have shortened this substantially to a maximum of 20 
workdays.12 
 
3 The data 
In the weekend of February 18th 2011 we have conducte  a survey on banking risks and the Dutch 
deposit insurance scheme. The survey was financed by the Ministry of Finance and was enumerated 
on a well-known internet panel owned by CentERdata, a commercial institute of the University of 
Tilburg. Other recent studies using the CentERpanel include Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) and Van 
Rooij et al. (2011). The panel constitutes a representative sample, selected from the Dutch municipal 
administration, and frequently answers questions about economic variables. In total 1,959 individuals 
answered our questions, out of the 2,740 individuals who were selected to participate, such that the 
response rate is 71.5 percent. The questionnaire revolves around questions concerning their 
assessment of various banking risks, such as the probability that certain banks will go bankrupt, and 
their knowledge of the Dutch deposit insurance scheme. In addition, CentER provided us with a series 
of useful background characteristics of those who answered our questions such as age, income and 
employment status. The appendix contains a table with full definitions of the variables used in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 1 gives some insight into the characteristics of the respondents. Column I presents descriptive 
statistics for all respondents, while in Columns II and III the sample is divided into those who only 
hold deposits at ‘systemic’ banks and those who (also) hold deposits at a minor bank. We consider 
ING, Rabobank and ABN Amro as large and systemic banks. Of the respondents that filled in the 
deposit questions 68 percent only has deposits at systemic banks. Overall, the mean age of 
respondents is over 50, implying that respondents are relatively old.  There is a remarkable differenc 
in education levels between the different banking statu  groups. Of those who are customers at 
systemic banks only, 34 percent finished a bachelors or a master degree. This percentage is a lot 
higher for those who are customers at a minor bank as well, at 54 percent. The customers of small 
banks are also relatively richer as their average amount of total deposits is almost twice as high. 
Additionally, the group of respondents that owns deposits at minor banks is a customer at almost 
twice as many banks. 
 
The appendix includes a full list of banks that respondents own deposits with. From Table 1 it can be 
seen that the majority of respondents owns an account at ING Bank. This can partly be explained by 
the fact that ING incorporated the former Postbank - a bank that used to operate an independent 
payment system. Almost half of respondents own deposits at the Rabobank, while an additional one 
third is a customer at ABN Amro. It is interesting to see that the group of respondents with at least 
one minor bank is relatively overrepresented within ING but relatively underrepresented at the 
Rabobank. There are also remarkable differences between the knowledge the sample claims to 
possess for the different systemic banks. Rabobank seems to be most well-known, while ABN Amro 
is least well-known. Almost five percent of our sample was recently hit by a bankruptcy: two percent 
 
12 See amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay: ‘The payout 
delay should therefore be reduced to a period of 20 working days. That period should be extended only under exceptional 





of respondents was a customer at (Landsbanki) IceSave, while three percent of respondents was a 







Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  (I) (II) (III) 
Selection  All respondents Respondents 
with only large 
banks 
Respondents 
with deposits at 
minor bank 
Observations  1,959   
  of which level of deposits known  1,773 68% 32% 
Percentage men  44% 45% 43% 
Percentage with partner  77% 76% 77% 
Perc. low education (primary/ vmbo) 30% 35% 22% 
Perc. tertiary education 41% 34% 54% 
Age respondent Mean 54.7 54.3 55.6 
 SD 14.8 15.2 14.1 
Net monthly household income Mean  €         2,938   €         2,903   €         3,006  
 SD 4,494 5,410 1,453 
Total deposits held at banks Mean €         44,842 €         35,911 €         64,096 
 SD 62,988 51,590 77,616 
Respondents with more than 100.000 
euro in total deposits 
 11% 10% 11% 
Number of banks Mean 1.8 1.4 2.7 
 SD 1.1 0.5 1.3 
Owns deposits at ING  59% 56% 66% 
Owns deposits at Rabobank  49% 54% 38% 
Owns deposits at ABN Amro  31% 32% 27% 
Self-assessed knowledge of ING (1-5) Mean 3.03 2.95 3.17 
 SD 0.91 0.88 0.91 
Self-assessed knowledge of Rabobank  Mean 3.28 3.30 3.24 
 SD 1.07 0.99 1.05 
Self-assessed knowledge of ABN Amro Mean 2.80 2.78 2.85 
 SD 1.02 0.93 0.99 
Used to own deposits at IceSave  2% 0% 5% 







4 Knowledge of and trust in the DI-scheme 
In this section we explore to what extent respondents u derstand the rules and regulations of the 
Dutch deposit insurance scheme as well as to what extent individuals believe these rules will indeed 
be implemented in case of hypothetical future bankruptcies. 
4.1 Knowledge of the DI-scheme 
Knowledge of the existence of and eligibility for deposit insurance is a prerequisite for the proper 
functioning of it. If DI is to prevent bank runs deposit holders should, up to certain degree, be aware 
that their claims are guaranteed. Of course, there is no need for deposit holders to know every detail 
of the system for every bank, as long as they know enough about their own situation. Our 
questionnaire included several questions to gather information about the respondents’ knowledge.  
 
The first set of questions involves the funding andcoverage offered by the DI-scheme in the course of 
the recent bankruptcies of two Dutch banks, Icesave and DSB. We asked respondents two true/false 
questions concerning the maximum guaranteed amount: a) “A deposit holder with a normal savings 
account at IceSave/ DSB - owned by him alone - held120.000 euro in this account. He did not receive 
all his deposits back.” and b) “A deposit holder with a normal savings account at IceSave/ DSB - 
owned by him and his wife - held 120,000 euro in ths account. He did not receive all his deposits 
back.” As the maximum covered amount is 100,000 euro pe  individual the correct answer to the first 
question is true, while the correct answer to the second question is false. Table 2 reports on the 
answers given. The first question was answered corre tly by 87% of respondents. The second 
question, on the guaranteed amount for a joint account, was answered correctly by 26% of 
respondents. There is more knowledge about the coverage of the DI-scheme among those with 
deposits at a minor bank. 
 
We also asked “Who eventually paid the largest part of the bill after DSB went bankrupt?”. Table 4 
summarizes the answers to this question. The same question was also raised for IceSave, but because 
it is still unclear what the correct answer to this question is, we omit it here. Because DSB operated 
under the Dutch DI-scheme, the other Dutch banks eventually paid for the payments to DSB 
depositors. This question should be interpreted as an indicator for knowledge on the scheme. 
Obviously, depositors do not have to be aware of who pays in order for the DI-scheme to work as 
intended. The correct answer was chosen by 34 percent of respondents, while 25 percent indicated 
they do not have a clue who paid the deposit holders in the end. Again, respondents who own some 
deposits at a minor bank turn out to be more ´sophisticated´: they are better informed about the rules 
and regulations of the DI-scheme.  
 
In addition, we asked respondents what would happen to the deposit holders if a particular bank went 
bankrupt within the next five years. Respondents were divided into six groups and each group had to 
answer questions about the hypothetical bankruptcy of either ING, Rabobank, ABN Amro, Triodos 
Bank (a small bank but relatively well-known Dutch bank with a green image), Bank of Scotland (a 
foreign bank with a license in the UK that does a lot of marketing in The Netherlands) or 
AnadoluBank (a relatively unknown bank with Turkish origins that has a license from the Dutch 
Central Bank). Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents who believe that a particular deposit 
insurance scheme would come into play. The bold itaic numbers represent correct answers. For 
Dutch systemic banks, more than 80 percent of respondents are correct concerning the DI-situation. 
This percentage drops for the smaller banks under review: 64% thinks that Triodos Bank fall under 
the Dutch DI scheme. When considering the Bank of Sc tland and AnadoluBank, respectively 31% 






Table 2: Percentage of respondents answering DI-knowledge questions 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Selection All respondents Respondents 
with only large 
banks 
Respondents 
with deposits at 
minor bank 
Correct on coverage ‘single’ account 87% 85% 89% 
Correct on coverage joint account 26% 25% 30% 
    
Who paid eventually for DSB’s bankruptcy? 
The Dutch Central Bank 16% 16% 16% 
The other banks in The Netherlands 34% 30% 43% 
The Dutch central government 23% 25% 19% 
The European Central Bank 1% 1% 2% 
I don´t have a clue 25% 28% 20% 
 
Although for small banks the percentage of respondents choosing the correct answer is low, 
accountholders at such banks are probably better awa e of the particular coverage offered. 
Unfortunately we cannot test this presumption directly, as there are only a handful of depositors at 
these banks in our dataset. What we have done however, is split the sample into those who only own 
deposits at systemic banks and those who (also) own deposits at a minor bank, as in Tables 1 and 2. 
The last two rows in Table 3 depict the results. Here, we do see that knowledge about the eligibility 
for the DI-scheme for large banks is greater among respondents with an account at a small bank. 
Contrary to our prediction however, knowledge about the eligibility for the DI-scheme for the Bank of 
Scotland and Anadolu Bank is not better for customers of a small bank. This suggests that even 
accountholders at small banks do not know whether thei deposits are covered or not. 
Table 3: Percentage of respondents answering which DI-scheme applies 
What will happen to deposits if bank A will go 
bankrupt? 








        
This bank does not fall under the Dutch DI-
scheme. The deposit holders will lose their 
assets. 
2% 2% 2% 16% 15% 41% 
This bank does not fall under the Dutch DI-
scheme, but does fall under a scheme in another 
country. The deposit holders will get (a part of) 
their deposits back.  
1% 0% 4% 12% 31% 19% 
This bank falls under the Dutch DI-scheme. 
The deposit holders will receive their deposits 
back up to a certain maximum per person. 
83% 83% 80% 64% 48% 37% 
This bank falls under the Dutch DI-scheme. 
The deposit holders will always receive all of 
their deposits back. 
13% 15% 15% 8% 6% 2% 
       
Percentage with correct answer       
   of respondents with only large banks 82% 79% 77% 58% 31% 38% 
   of respondents with deposits at minor bank 86% 93% 87% 75% 32% 36% 
 
To look in more detail into the determinants of knowledge, Table 4 presents the results from probit 
regressions of four different variables that represent ome knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme. 





income category, education level, age category and whether one had an account at one of the banks 
that did go bankrupt.  
 
Column I looks at knowledge of the actual situation during DSB’s bankruptcy. The dependent 
variable here equals one when a respondent was aware of the fact that other banks in The Netherlands 
had to eventually pay the depositors of the bankrupt DSB, and zero otherwise.13 Both the log of total 
deposits and self-assessed knowledge of banks explain existing knowledge of the DI-scheme. In 
addition, high-income individuals and men are more likely to know who repaid depositors after DSB 
failed. Columns II and III examine knowledge of themaximum coverage. The dependent variable in 
column II equals one when an individual knew that a depositholder is not covered for 150.000 euro in 
a single account and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column III equals one when an 
individual knew that he would be covered if it was a joint account (as the maximum coverage is 
100.000 euro per individual). Wealthy individuals are more likely to know simple details of DI-
coverage, while individuals with a low education level are less likely to know such details. Self-
assessed knowledge has a positive impact on involved details, such as who paid depositors after the 
DSB failure and the guaranteed amount for a joint account. However, none of the other included 
variables significantly affects whether someone is aware of the double coverage rate for joint 
accounts.  
 
Column IV depicts the results for knowledge on what deposit insurance scheme applies for a 
particular bank in hypothetical future bankruptcies. First, it matters a lot for which bank individuals 
answer the question: respondents are much less likely to know the correct situation for small banks, in 
accordance with the results in table 3. It also appe rs that those who used to have an account at DSB 
(now bankrupt) have learned from their experience: th y are better at choosing the correct scheme. 
Also, a high level of income enhances the probability to be correct, while a low level of education 
seems detrimental to correctly assessing which DI-scheme a bank falls under. 
  
 






Table 4: Regression results on knowledge about the DI-scheme 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 













 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Mean self-assessed knowledge of 
systemic banks 
0.228** 0.087 0.102* 0.063 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Logarithm of total deposits 0.174** 0.146** 0.063 0.043 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Total deposits above 100.000 euro -0.234 0.006 0.121 0.156 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) 
Total number of banks -0.078 0.009 0.063 -0.011 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
At least one account at minor bank 0.196 0.052 -0.035 0.106 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) 
Used to have an account at 
DSB/IceSave 
0.417 0.186 0.21 0.449* 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.17) (0.20) 
Female respondent -0.636*** -0.059 -0.06 -0.091 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
High income (vs. low middle income) 0.579*** -0.205 0.086 0.324** 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
Low education (vs. middle education) -0.238 -0.230* 0.09 -0.269** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Systemic bank    0.641*** 
    (0.10) 
Bank of Scotland    -0.930*** 
    (0.11) 
Anadolu Bank    -0.737*** 
    (0.11) 
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Other (insignificant) controls Dummies for for being customer at ING, dummy for being a customer at 
Rabobank, gender dummy, partner dummy and age category 
N 890 1,750 1,750 1,750 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
 
4.2 Trust in the DI-scheme 
This section presents evidence on the confidence of d posit holders in the Dutch deposit insurance 
scheme. First we focus on the perceived pay-out time of the DI-scheme, both in recent bankruptcies 
and in hypothetical future bankruptcies. At the time of the survey, the Dutch Central Bank was 
committed to paying deposit holders their money back within three months (90 working days) after a 
bankruptcy. It indeed succeeded in doing so after th  two recent bankruptcies of Icesave and DSB.  
 
Figure 3 suggests that our respondents are not aware of the speed of DNB´s recent operations. Two 
thirds of respondents (72% in case of IceSave and 68% in case of DSB) estimate the realized pay-
back time to be half a year or longer. The average perceived pay-back time for the hypothetical 





Only 25% of individuals think it will take three months or less to get your deposits refunded under the 
DI-scheme. Respondents are the most optimistic about the period of time it takes to payout deposits of 
a bankrupt systemic bank, although they still overestimate the pay-back time. In this case, little over 
half of respondents believe it will take six months or longer.  
Figure 3: Respondents on payback time by the DI-scheme 
 
 
Our survey on banking risks and the deposit insurance scheme also contains direct information on the 
perceived credibility of the deposit insurance scheme. To measure respondents’ trust in the DI-scheme 
we have asked them the probability that a deposit hlder owning 50.000 euro will in reality receive 
this entire amount back in case of a bankruptcy.14 Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of 
answers. Clearly, individuals believe that payout is more likely when a systemic bank goes bankrupt. 
The average probability amounts to 73%, while 34% of individuals is absolutely certain the deposit 
holder will get her money back. The average probability for small banks is lower at 48%, while only 
16% of respondents fully trusts the DI-scheme in ths case. At face value, respondents apparently do 
not identify a potential problem of sustainability of the DI-scheme when one of the three large Dutch 
banks would go bankrupt. On the contrary, they worry about small banks instead. Note that for both 
types of bank a relatively large group chose a probability of 50%. 
  
 
14 It is true that this question can be interpreted as capturing both trust in the DI-scheme and knowledge. If people do not know that 
the coverage rate is as high as 100.000 euro, but instead believe it is say 40.000 euro, the probability of full payback equals zero. 
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Is is interesting to investigate the determinants of trust in the deposit insurance scheme. Knowledge of 
the scheme and whether the respondent thinks a bank falls under the DI-scheme might be important. 
The self-assessed knowledge of the bank specified in a particular question and whether the respondent 
has an account with that bank could also bias the respondent’s answer. In addition, respondents’ 
assessment might be affected if they have experienced the DI-scheme in practice because they held an 
account with either IceSave or DSB. Table 7 depicts regression coefficients of the two trust-
indicators, i.e. the perceived payback time in column I and the probability of payback in column II, on 
these variables.15 
 
The effects of the control variables are mostly as anticipated. Individuals who own an account at the 
bank for which they answer the question, believe in shorter payback times, but surprisingly not 
necessarily in a higher probability of payback. Respondents think that in case of bankruptcy of a 
systemic bank payout will be faster compared to smaller banks and that the probability of payback 
will be higher. Consumers who have first-hand experience with a bankruptcy and consumers that 
assess themselves as knowledgeable have more trust in the DI-system. Respondents that think 
systemic banks are more likely to fail have less tru t in the Dutch deposit insurance. Here, we use the 
bankruptcy probabilities that individuals assigned to systemic banks as each respondent answered 
these questions for the same banks. Knowledge on the DI-scheme seems to be an important covariate 
for trust. If individuals believe that their assigned bank falls under a foreign DI-scheme or under no 
DI-scheme at all, their trust in the scheme is significantly lower. Demographic characteristics play a 
minor role. Women are more skeptical about the trustworthiness of the DI-scheme, while individuals 
with more deposits at banks are more optimistic. Furthermore, only whether one has a partner is 
positively correlated with trust in the deposit insurance institution. 
  
 
15 There are twice as many observations in the first column as individuals answered the question both for either DSB or IceSave and 




































Table 5: Regressions of trust in Dutch DI-scheme 
 (I) (II)  
 Payback time (days)  Probability payback 
 b/se b/se 
Account at bank that (hypothetically) goes bankrupt -21.762** 3.039 
 (6.89) (1.86) 
Systemic bank -30.202*** 7.738*** 
 (8.69) (2.21) 
Triodos bank reference reference 
IceSave or DSB -5.709 N.A. 
 (6.98)  
Bank of Scotland 1.825 6.729** 
 (9.98) (2.40) 
Anadolu Bank 42.318*** -5.411* 
 (9.73) (2.33) 
Used to have an account at DSB/IceSave -50.130*** 12.338*** 
 (13.45) (3.66) 
Mean self-assessed knowledge of bank (1-5) -16.829*** 3.123** 
 (3.52) (1.01) 
Mean self-assessed probability systemic bank goes bankrupt 0.805** -0.299*** 
 (0.28) (0.08) 
Respondent believes bank does not fall under any DI-scheme 43.218*** -39.131*** 
 (9.94) (2.69) 
Respondent believes bank falls under foreign DI-scheme 30.351*** -21.766*** 
 (8.08) (2.40) 
Respondent believes bank falls under Dutch DI-scheme reference reference 
Respondent believes DI-scheme has full coverage 6.514 4.348 
 (11.07) (3.13) 
Respondent has correct beliefs DI-scheme -3.886 7.588** 
 (7.53) (2.33) 
Logarithm of total deposits -5.495* 3.094*** 
 (2.41) (0.66) 
Female respondent 20.385*** -7.634*** 
 (5.07) (1.38) 
Respondent has a partner -15.370* -1.333 
 (6.51) (1.74) 
Method OLS with clustered 
errors 
OLS 
N 3486 1745 
Other (insignificant) controls include total number of banks, having an account at a minor bank, age ctegories, 
income categories and education categories. 





5 Depositor behavior 
This section focuses on the behavior of deposit holders, in relationship to their knowledge of and trust 
in deposit insurance. In absence of reliable information about what the respondents would do while 
fearing for the safety of their deposits, we analyze how consumers allocate their savings over banks 
and how they responded to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
5.1 Allocation over banks 
The existence of a DI-scheme can also influence the allocation of deposits over the different banks in 
the market. In the absence of insurance, deposit holders can reduce their exposure to a potential bank
failure by distributing their savings over multiple banks. As long as failures are not fully correlated, 
this reduces the risk of being exposed to a bank failure. In the presence of fully trusted insurance, 
however, this incentive is absent for consumers with deposits below the DI’s maximum insurance 
threshold, but consumers with savings exceeding the maximum covered amount can still benefit from 
spreading their deposits. Thus, we expect that consumers with wealth above the DI-threshold will 
hold more accounts with different banks. In this section we therefore analyze with how many different 
banks depositors hold accounts and whether this choice is influenced by their knowledge of and trust 
in the DI-scheme.  
 
In table 8 we present regression coefficients on the total number of banks a respondent holds his 
savings with (Column I) as well as the extent to which respondents concentrate their savings at one 
bank (Columns II and III). From Column I we learn that total deposits are an important determinant of 
the number of banks consumers have: respondents with more savings hold those savings with a larger 
number of banks. They may benefit more from hedging against bank failure by spreading their 
savings over multiple banks. The dependent variable in Columns II and III is the ratio of an 
individual's deposits with the bank where the individual owns most deposits over her total deposits at 
all banks. The columns show that wealthier deposit holders are also more prone to concentrate their 
deposits at one of the banks they are a customer with. Wealthier consumers have more to gain from 
looking for a high interest rate. Perhaps they hold more accounts in order to easily transfer money 
when interest rates go up elsewhere or when the perceiv d bankruptcy probability of their main bank 
increases. On the other hand, another significant coeffi ient in Columns II and III is the dummy for 
those whose aggregate deposits exceed 100.000 euro. These individuals spread their savings more 
evenly across banks, perhaps in order to remain below the maximum covered amount. 
 
Also, respondents that assess their own knowledge of systemic banks as relatively high are more 
likely to hold accounts with multiple banks. The same holds for respondents that assign relatively 
high bankruptcy probabilities. It makes sense to hedge more when you feel bankruptcies are more 
likely. In addition, those who used to have an account with DSB or IceSave turn out to be consumers 
holding deposits with a relatively large number of banks and they also tend to concentrate their 
savings more with one bank. This suggests that these consumers are particularly prone to look for the 
highest interest rate.  
 
In Column IV we focus on the sample of individuals who own more than 100.000 euro in total 
deposits at banks. Using data on each bank they hold deposits, we have estimated a probit regression 
on whether the deposits at a particular bank cross the virtual 100.000 euro threshold. Since most of 
these rich individuals are a customer at more than one bank, this means we use multiple observations 
per individual in this regression. Some interesting results emerge. First, as expected, wealthier 
individuals are more likely to exceed the DI-coverage threshold at any particular bank. Also as 
expected, the more banks, the less likely it is that a respondent´s deposits at one bank exceed 100.000 





is negatively associated with crossing the threshold. Here, knowledge seems important for behavior. 
Computing the marginal effect at the mean however indicates that the effect is small: an informed 
individual is 7% more likely to stay under the threshold. Another significant coefficient is the one for
the self-assessed knowledge of each bank. The more respondents know about a bank, the more likely 
they are to entrust uninsured deposits to the bank. Here the marginal effect is larger: one unit more 
self-assessed knowledge (on a five-point scale) increases the probability of crossing the threshold with
10%. 
Table 6: The number of banks consumers hold accounts with 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Dependent variable Total number of 
banks 
Concentration of 
deposits at most 
important bank 
Concentration of 




euro at a bank 
Sample All Those with 2 banks Those with 3 banks Those with 
total deposits 
above 100.000  
     
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
Logarithm of total deposits 0.444*** 0.087*** 0.127*** 3.017*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.28) 
Total deposits above 100.000 euro -0.143 -0.053* -0.139**  
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.04)  
Correct on what DI-scheme would 
apply 
-0.083 -0.012 -0.019 -0.399* 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.19) 
Probability that DI-scheme will 
pay out as promised 
0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expected payback time -0.012 -0.010 -0.003 -0.063 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 
Mean self-assessed knowledge of 
systemic banks (or knowledge of 
bank in column IV) 
0.136** 0.002 0.000 0.545*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) 
Mean probability of bankruptcy 
systemic banks 
0.007* 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Used to have an account at 
DSB/IceSave 
1.650*** 0.184*** 0.173*** 1.155** 
 (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.44) 
Systemic bank    0.265 
    (0.24) 
Total number of banks    -0.857*** 
    (0.11) 
N 1,750 623 204 426 
Method Ordered probit OLS OLS Probit with 
clustered 
standard errors 
Other (insignificant) controls gender dummy, partner dummy, education level, income category and age 
category 







5.2 Withdrawals in the wake of the financial crisis 
In this section, we investigate observed behavior of respondents during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
In the end, a deposit insurance scheme is also meant to calm depositors in times of distress, and we 
would like to know whether respondents with more knowledge of and trust in the scheme behaved 
accordingly in the most recent financial crisis. In our survey, we have confronted our respondents 
with some recall questions relating to the financial risis. We realize recall questions three/four years 
after an event are far from perfect. However, the answers are the only piece of information we have to 
analyze this relationship.  
  
First, we’ve asked respondents whether they decided to transfer their savings to ´a safer place´ during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis . About 6% of responde ts answered yes to this question. The vast 
majority of these respondents stated that they transferred their money to another bank. Column I in 
Table 9 reports probit regression coefficients for this yes/no variable. Correspondents with more 
deposits were more likely to put their savings in asafer place. This is intuitive, as wealthier peopl 
have more to lose when banks get into trouble. Alsointuitively, people who assign high average 
bankruptcy probabilities were more likely to put their savings in a safer place. Finally, respondents 
with first-hand bankruptcy experience at IceSave and DSB were more likely to put their savings in a 
safer place. This might be because these consumers were forced to do so precisely by these 
bankruptcies.  
 
We have also asked “What consequences did the recent bankruptcy of IceSave/ DSB have for you?”, 
randomizing between IceSave and DSB. This question was raised in order to focus on the response to 
a specific event. Out of all respondents 32% answered that they were now more aware of the risks 
associated with banking, while another 6% of respondents answered that not only were they more 
aware of risks, but that they also acted upon this new awareness. This group of respondents either 
changed banks or spread their deposits over more accounts. Column II in Table 7 presents the results 
of a multinomial logit regression for this variable, in which the actions are bundled under 
‘transactions’. We find that those respondents who answered that they were now more aware of the 
risks of banking were those with more wealth, but also those with more knowledge. We use the 
knowledge variable for systemic banks here as this variable is comparable across respondents. Those 
who were correct on which DI-scheme applied, those who knew more about banks and highly 
educated individuals were all more likely to have ´learned´ from the previous bankruptcies. Also 
female respondents belonged to this group. Considering transactions, a somewhat different picture 
emerges. Obviously, the most important coefficient here is whether an individual used to have 
deposits at either IceSave or DSB. Again, individuals with more deposits are more likely to have 
experienced ´consequences´ of the bankruptcies. But the other significant coefficients for ´actions´ do 
not overlap those for ´no actions´. Those who assign h h bankruptcy probabilities, those with more 
banks and those who own at least some deposits at a minor bank were more likely to act upon the 








Table 7: did respondent decide whether or not to put savings in safer place 
 (I) (II)  
 Flight to safety Bankruptcy consequences 
  More aware of 
risks, no 
actions 
More aware of 
risks, 
transactions 
 b/se b/se b/se 
 
Logarithm of total deposits 0.268*** 0.166** 0.327** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) 
Correct on what DI-scheme would apply -0.048 0.299* -0.041 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.26) 
Probability that DI-scheme will pay out as promised 0.000 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expected payback time 0.008 0.065 0.050 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
Mean self-assessed knowledge of systemic banks  0.115 0.207* 0.222 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.17) 
Mean probability of bankruptcy systemic banks 0.014* -0.001 0.026* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Used to have an account at DSB/IceSave 0.708*** 0.473 1.088** 
 (0.19) (0.30) (0.37) 
Total number of banks 0.082 -0.094 0.229* 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) 
Respondent has an account at a minor bank 0.254* 0.103 0.729** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.28) 
Female respondent -0.09 0.248* 0.063 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.24) 
Low education category -0.089 0.129 -0.011 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.33) 
Middle education category    
High education category -0.013 0.421** 0.199 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.28) 
Method Probit Multinomial logitt 
Observations 1690 1719 
    
Other (insignificant) controls include a dummy for having a partner, the log of total deposits, number of banks, 
whether respondent has an account at a minor bank, income categories, age categories, education categories  






6 Preferences on the DI-scheme: timeliness 
versus coverage 
A final section in our questionnaire on banking risks and the deposit insurance scheme aims to 
uncover preferences of deposit holders concerning the set-up of the scheme. All respondents were 
asked to choose which of three future policy options they preferred most. The three options were 
combinations of the maximum amount covered by the deposit insurance scheme and the number of 
days it would take to pay back deposits. The options were structured such that the option with the 
highest guaranteed amount also pertained the longest pay-back time and vice versa. In this way, in 
choosing a particular option the respondents were forced to make a trade-off between a shorter pay-
back time and a lower coverage. This allows us to de ermine how much coverage respondents are 
willing to give up in return for a shorter pay-back period. Although every respondent was only 
presented with one set of options, in total six different option sets were presented, differing only i 
their suggested pay-back time. In short, all respondents could choose between a maximum coverage 
of 20.000, 40.000 or 100.000 euro, but the associated pay-back times differed (between 1 day, 7 days, 
14 days, 30 days and 100 days).  
 
The majority of deposit holders, namely 75%, chose a policy options in which the guaranteed amount 
was highest. Only 7% of them preferred the shortest pay-back time, associated with a coverage of 
20.000 euro. The moderate policy option (coverage at 40.000 euro, moderate pay-back time) was 
preferred by 18% of respondents. This choice is heavily influenced by the wealth level of individuals, 
as table 8 indicates. Those who can afford a short payback time - as they have assets below the lowest 
coverage option - choose this option more often. Even in these groups however the highest coverage 
alternative is preferred. 
Table 8: Percentage of respondents preferring policy option deposit insurance 
Preferred option €20.000 early €40.000 €100.000 late 
Total deposits NA  8% 20% 72% 
Total deposits around €5.000  14% 21% 66% 
Total deposits around €10.000  9% 26% 66% 
Total deposits around €20.000  9% 19% 72% 
Total deposits around €50.000  1% 16% 83% 
Total deposits around €140.000  0% 10% 90% 
 
 
We have investigated the demographic origins of the coverage preferences in more detail in Table 9. 
The table reports coefficients of ordinal probit regressions of the chosen coverage and the chosen pay-
back time on various characteristics, including knowledge of and trust in the current DI-scheme. It 
becomes clear that not only wealthier individuals are more in favor of a high guaranteed amount. Also 
those with a higher income (and perhaps therefore higher future wealth) prefer a high coverage level 
(and a long pay-back time). Interestingly, individuals with more banks were more likely to choose a 
policy option with a lower coverage level and a shorter pay-back time. This could be related to the 
lower amounts they have at risk at any particular bank. Furthermore, those who assign high 
bankruptcy probabilities were more likely to prefer lower coverage rates. Although the coefficient for 





the more respondents value liquidity. Finally, both trust in and knowledge of the deposit insurance 
scheme are correlated with a preference for a high coverage level (and a long payback time). 
Apparently, if people are convinced that the DI-scheme will operate as planned, they are willing to 
wait longer for their lost deposits.  
 
Table 9: Regression coefficients for DI-preferences 
 (I) (II) 
 Preferred coverage level Preferred pay-back time 
 b/se b/se 
   
Logarithm of total deposits 5.284*** 3.589*** 
 (0.68) (0.91) 
Correct on what DI-scheme would 
apply 
2.024 1.607 
 (1.50) (1.99) 
Probability that DI-scheme will pay 
out as promised 
0.100*** 0.066* 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Expected payback time 1.798*** 1.419 
 (0.54) (0.72) 
Mean self-assessed knowledge of 
systemic banks  
1.050 2.251 
 (0.99) (1.31) 
Mean probability of bankruptcy 
systemic banks 
-0.203** -0.166 
 (0.08) (0.10) 
Used to have an account at 
DSB/IceSave 
2.453 -1.577 
 (3.50) (4.64) 
Total number of banks -2.085* -1.568 
 (0.85) (1.13) 
Respondent has an account at a 
minor bank 
0.988 1.831 
 (1.74) (2.31) 
Low income category 5.536 10.461* 
 (3.28) (4.36) 
Low middle income category 
(reference) 
  
High middle income category 7.555*** 6.467* 
 (2.15) (2.86) 
High income category 5.688** 3.977 
 (2.19) (2.92) 
Method Ordinal probit Ordinal probit 
Other (insignificant) controls gender, level of education, income category, wealth ca egory, age category, 
knowledge dummies 
Observations 1741 1741 








In response to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, deposit insurance schemes in the European union have 
undergone a major overhaul. Coverage has been extended and unified, while the maximum refund 
period has been shortened substantially. Empirical esearch that may shed light on the effectiveness of 
these measures is relatively scarce, however. In particul r, no research exists into consumers’ 
knowledge and perception of such schemes. Important aspects include consumer knowledge of DI 
terms (do consumers know whether they are insured), an  their assessment of payback times and how 
much they expect to receive (how effective do consumers think the execution of the scheme is).  
 
We find that particularly knowledge of the eligibilty of small banks to deposit insurance is limited, 
even by accountholders at small banks. Consumers differ widely in their perception of what fraction 
of deposit they will actually get refunded in case of a bank failure and how long this will take. They 
vastly overestimate the number of days it has taken in the recent past to pay back deposits.  
 
Our results indicate that trust in the deposit insurance scheme is not highly correlated with behavior. 
Knowledge on the eligibility of certain banks for deposit insurance however seems to be correlated 
with a stronger tendency to spread savings over banks d with the probability to stay under the 
maximum guaranteed amount at a particular bank. In addition, individuals´ subjective risk assessment 
of banks partly determines the number of banks wealth is spread over. We show furthermore that this 
risk assessment is associated with the ´flight to safety´ during the past financial crisis and 
´transactions´ after the specific recent bankruptcies in The Netherlands. This suggests that differences 
in perceived banking risks enhance the tendency to run on the bank. 
 
Finally, depositors seem to prefer a deposit insurance scheme with a higher coverage rate over a 
scheme that has a shorter payback time. This preferenc  is stronger for those with high levels of bank 
deposits, while trust in and knowledge of the deposit in urance scheme are also correlated with a 
preference for a high coverage level. Apparently, if people are convinced that the DI-scheme will 
operate as planned, they are willing to wait longer for their lost deposits.  
 
Concerning policy implications, consumers generally l ck knowledge of the more detailed workings 
of the DI-scheme, while they have overly pessimistic expectations of the way the scheme will be 
executed. This casts doubt on the effectiveness of DI-scheme as a means to prevent bank runs and at 
the same time points to the potential for government policies focusing on educating the public to 
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Tabel 1: Respondent had a checkings and/or savings account at bank X somewhere in 
the period after 1-1-2007 until 1-1-2010. 
Bank Respondents 
ING/ Postbank 1,090 
Rabobank 930 
ABN AMRO/ Fortis 548 
SNS Bank + RegioBank 233 
ASN Bank 141 
Aegon Bank 87 
Dirk Scheringa Bank  59 
Robeco Direct 55 
MoneYou 39 
Triodos Bank 37 
IceSave 33 
Friesland Bank 32 
Argenta 27 
CreditEurope Bank 22 
OHRA Bank 20 
Van Lanschot Bankiers 19 
Amsterdam Trade Bank 18 
NIB Capital 18 
AKBank 16 
Allianz 7 
Centraal Beheer 7 
YapiCredi Bank 7 
AnadoluBank 5 
Bank of Scotland 4 
GarantiBank 4 
DHB Bank 3 
Westland Utrecht Bank 3 
ASR Bank 2 
Binck bank 2 
KASBANK 2 
Leaseplan Bank 2 
The Economy bank 2 
Bank of America 1 
BNP Paribas 1 
Directbank 1 
Duitse Postbank 1 
Jyske Bank 1 









  Account at bank that 
(hypothetically) goes bankrupt 
Respondent is a client of bank X that hypothetically 
goes bankrupt in the questionnaire. 
Age category Age of respondent in six categories: 1) age 15-24, 
2) age 25-34, 3) age 35-44, 4) age 45-54, 5) age 55-
64, 6) age 65 and over. 
Bank Respondent had a checkings and/or savings account 
at bank X somewhere in the period after 1-1-2007 
until 1-1-2010.  Both individual and joint accounts 
should be reported. 
Bank falls under DI-scheme Bank in question falls under the supervision of the 
Dutch Central Bank and its deposits are therefore 
eligible for the Dutch DI-scheme. In our sample and
not eligible for Dutch DI: Bank of Scotland, 
Argenta, BNP Paribas, Bank of America, 
Directbank, Duitse Postbank, Jyske Bank, Lloyds 
TSB. 
Bankruptcy consequences Recode of question v20: what did the bankruptcy of 
DSB/IceSave (randomly assigned) meant to you 
personally? 1) Nothing, 2) More aware of the risks 
of banking, no actions, 3) More aware of the risks 
of banking and I actually transferred deposits.  
Choice of policy option deposit 
insurance 
Imagine the government decides to implement a 
new deposit insurance scheme. Which of the 
following policy options has your preference? 1) 
Deposits at Dutch banks will be insured up to 
20.000 EUR. When a bank goes bankrupt, it will 
take 1 day/ 7 days (options randomly drawn), 
before the deposits will be repaid. 2) Deposits at 
Dutch banks will be insured up to 40.000 EUR. 
When a bank goes bankrupt, it will take 14 days/ 30 
days (options randomly drawn), before the deposits 
will be repaid. 3) Deposits at Dutch banks will be 
insured up to 100.000 EUR. When a bank goes 
bankrupt, it will take  30 days/ 100 days (options 
randomly drawn), before the deposits will be 
repaid.  3 Spaartegoeden bij Nederlandse banken 
worden tot een maximum van 100.000 euro 
vergoed. Het duurt 30 dagen voordat, bij een 
faillissement, tot terugbetaling wordt overgegaan 
Concentration of deposits at most 
important bank 
The ratio of an individual's deposits at the bank 
where the individual owns most deposits over her 
total deposits at all banks. 
Correct coverage difficult true/false Respondent answered true to the statement that an 
individual owning 150.000 EUR in a joint account 
would get their deposits back entirely, when the 
bank would go bankrupt. 
Correct coverage easy true/false Respondent answered fasle to the statement that an 
individual owning 150.000 EUR in an individual 
account would get their deposits back entirely, 
when the bank would go bankrupt. 





bankruptcies correctly on bank X. Imagine bank X goes 
bankrupt. According to the rules, what will than 
happen to the deposits of regular depositholders? 1 
This bank is not covered by the Dutch deposit 
insurance scheme. The accountholders will have 
lost their deposits. 2 This bank is not covered by the 
Dutch deposit insurance scheme, but is covered by 
the DI-scheme in another country. The deposits will 
be paid back (up to a certain maximum). 3 This 
bank falls under the Dutch deposit insurance 
scheme. The deposits will be paid back up to a 
certain maximum per person.  4 This bank falls 
under the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme. All 
depositholders will be fully refunded at all times. 
Correct on who paid depositors 
DSB 
Respondent was correct on the question which 
institution(s) eventually paid back the deposits of 
accountholders at DSB/ IceSave (randomly drawn).  
Correct ranking bankruptcy 
probability systemic vs. small 
banks 
Dummy is one when respondent beliefs that the 
average bankruptcy probability of systemic banks is 
lower than the average bankruptcy probability of 
other banks.  
Correct ranking problems 
probability ING vs. Rabobank 
Dummy is one when respondent beliefs that the 
probability that a bank might face problems paying 
back deposits is larger at the ING than at the 
Rabobank (which rating agencies agree with).  
Daughter of bank outside EU AKBank, DHB Bank, GarantiBank, AnadoluBank, 
CreditEurope Bank, Amsterdam Trade Bank, 
YapiCredi Bank. 
Dummy for accountholder Variable equals one when respondent own a 
checking and/or savingsaccount at this bank. 
Education level Highest diploma received in three categories: 1) 
lower level (primary education or vocational 
secondary education), 2) middle level (general 
secondary education or lower-level vocational 
training), 2) higher level (tertiary education). 
Expected payback time How long do you think it will last - approximately - 
until an accountholder at bank X with deposits of 
EUR 50.000 gets her deposits back, when bank X 
would go bankrupt?: 1) One week, 2) Two weeks, 
3) One month, 4) Two months, 5) Three months, 5) 
Half a year, 6) One year. 
Female respondent Respondent is female, not male. 
Flight to safety Respondent answered yes to the question: During 
the financial crisis in 2007/2008, did you decide to 
keep your money in a safer place? 
(Daughter of) foreign bank Bank of Scotland, Allianz, AKBank, DHB Bank, 
GarantiBank, AnadoluBank, CreditEurope Bank, 
Argenta, Amsterdam Trade Bank, YapiCredi Bank, 
BNP Paribas, Bank of America, Directbank, Duitse 
Postbank, Jyske Bank, Lloyds TSB, OTP, The 
Economy bank. 
Holding more than 100.000 euro at 
a bank 
Respondent holds more than 100.000 euro at a 
single bank. The coverage rate of the DI-scheme 





whenever the bank will go bankrupt. 
Household income categories Net monthly household income in four categories: 
1) low income: EUR 1150 or less, 2) low middle-
income: EUR 1151-1800, 3) high middle-income: 
EUR  1801-2600, 4) high income: EUR 2601 or 
higher. 
Mean probability of bankruptcy 
systemic banks 
Average per respondent of bankruptcy probability 
for ABN Amro, ING and Rabobank. 
Mean self-assessed knowledge of 
systemic banks  
Average per respondent of self-assessed knowledge 
for ABN Amro, ING and Rabobank. 
Preferred coverage level The coverage level individuals prefer when asked to 
chose between different policy options. 
Preferred pay-back time The pay-back time individuals prefer when asked to 
chose between different policy options. 
Probability that DI-scheme will pay 
out as promised 
How would you estimate the probability that an 
accountholder at bank X with deposits of EUR 
50.000 would fully get her deposits back, when 
bank X would go bankrupt?  
Reason to have an account at bank 
X 
Recoding of question r[n]r3 1) No account 2) For 
no particular reason 3) The interest is attractive 4) 
The products and service are attractive 5) The 
financial position of the bank is stable 6) Different 
reason. 
Respondent has a partner Respondent has a partner and is thus not single. 
Respondent has an account at a 
minor bank 
Respondent has an account at a bank that is not 
considered systemic. 
Self-assessed knowledge of bank How much do you know about bank X? Provide an 
answer between 1 (no knowledge) to 5 (a lot of 
knowledge). 
Subjective bankruptcy probability  How would you assess the probability that bank X 
will go bankrupt within the next five years? Give an 
answer between 0 (no chance) and 100 (this will 
certainly happen).  
Systemic bank ABN Amro, ING and Rabobank. 
(Logarithm of) total deposits (Logarithm of) total deposits (in checking and 
savings accounts) at banks. 
Total number of banks Total number of banks a respondent has accounts 
with. 
Used to have an account at 
DSB/IceSave 
Respondent had an account at DSB or IceSave 
somewhere in the period after 1-1-2007 until 1-1-
2010. 
 
